The adviser leaves when the hard part starts
A banker who loses a process keeps the year's other mandates. An executive has the company's competitiveness at stake.
The adviser delivers the closing and the next morning he is on another mandate, which is exactly when the hard part starts. I worked that out when I moved into industry, after almost nine years in investment banking between 1998 and 2006. Mistakes do not cost the same on both sides of the table: the adviser loses one of the processes he is running that year, and the executive can lose his company's competitiveness or his board's confidence.
Robertson Stephens, London, telecoms and technology. Then Lehman Brothers, first London and later Madrid, on the mergers and acquisitions team. Three public offerings, three bond issues and twelve transactions: eighteen processes in almost nine years, with two or three live at any one time.
The adviser's job ends on signing day, which is when the job of whoever stays begins
He delivers the price, the structure, the contract and the press release, collects the success fee and moves to the next mandate. The trade works that way by design, because the incentive is placed on closing and anyone answers to the incentive they have. The banker is not the problem: it shows up when the company confuses one thing with the other and treats the integration as done on signing day.
What comes next is two sales teams that have spent five years taking accounts off one another, two systems that will not talk, and a customer calling in whom nobody can claim. None of that appears in the model, and the model was correct.
Mistakes do not cost the same on both sides of the table
An adviser who loses a process has had a bad year and little more. Of the ones he is running in parallel some will already have closed and some will close, a few because he brought them in and others because they were assigned to him, so the cost spreads across the portfolio of mandates and gets replaced by the next one.
Whoever is inside has no portfolio. A decision taken badly shows up in the price, in the delivery time or in the people who leave, and it accumulates over quarters before anybody calls it by its name. It can cost the company its competitiveness and, well before that, the confidence of its board, which is the part that takes real work to rebuild.
Inside a company there is nowhere to hide, and less so if it is in transformation
In a stable company a mistake dilutes into the inertia and takes a while to surface. In one growing fast or going through a restructuring it does not: every decision touches next quarter's cash and everybody sees it, starting with the team. Whoever decided is back at the same table on Monday with the same people in front of them, and that is why conversations a bank closes with one phone call take months inside.
What I saw when I changed chairs
At Panda I came in as chief financial officer in 2006, moved to chief executive in 2008 and left in 2011, with operations in sixty-three countries and thirteen companies bought over those five years. Two years signing the accounts teach you how a company breathes. Running it teaches you the accounts were the summary, and that the quarter had been decided weeks earlier in a conversation nobody wrote down.
Thirteen acquisitions in five years integrate with people who remember to call each other. The model does not help there.
From those years I kept one line I still use: a closing is permission to start working.
Frequently asked
Why do integrations fail after an acquisition?
Because the work that gets planned is the deal and the work that decides the outcome starts the day after signing: two sales teams that have spent years taking accounts off one another, two systems that will not talk and customers who do not know who to call. The financial model can be correct and cover none of it.
What is the difference between advising on a deal and executing it from inside?
How the risk is spread. The adviser works with a portfolio of mandates and a lost process is offset by the next one. The executive has no portfolio, and the mistake shows up in the price, the delivery time or the people who leave, over several quarters.
Is moving from investment banking into industry worth it?
Two years signing the accounts teach you how a company breathes, and running it teaches you the accounts were the summary. What you give up is the ability to change subject every three months.
What happens the day after an acquisition is signed?
The part that was not in the contract begins: systems, customer base, duplicated teams and prices that do not match. In a company that is growing or restructuring, that shows up in next quarter's cash.
Facts and sources
- Juan Santana executed 3 IPOs, 3 bond issues and 12 M&A transactions in investment banking between 1998 and 2006, at Robertson Stephens and Lehman Brothers: 18 processes in almost 9 years. (Juan Santana's CV, August 2026; the total is the sum of the three)
- One of those IPOs was Wavecom on the Nouveau Marché; two carried equity valuations above USD 2bn, and the largest M&A transaction reached USD 2.5bn. (same source)
- At Panda Security he was chief financial officer from 2006 and chief executive from 2008 until 2011. The group integrated 13 companies in five years, with operations in 63 countries. (same source)
- The asymmetry Juan Santana points to between adviser and executive: the adviser who loses a process keeps the year's other mandates, while the executive has the company's competitiveness and the board's confidence at stake. (Juan Santana, mykobu.com, April 2026)
Who writes this
Juan Santana. Investor and independent director. Law at the University of Navarra and an MBA from IESE. Investment banking at Robertson Stephens and Lehman Brothers, then general management at Panda Security, Groupalia, Plenummedia and Publicar / Guru. Founding investor in seventeen companies since 2011, six sold and four closed.
The full profile, with the portfolio and the countries, is at Flight JS54.